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The point of departure for the Power, Confl ict and Democracy 
Programme (PCD) is the critique of the two conventional explanations for 
the problems of democratisation in the global South for being empirically 
mistaken and based on narrow and static theory.2 We argue that the root 
causes for the crisis of democratisation are neither poor application of the 
mainstream model (emphasising elitist pacts and institution-building in 
return for more privatisation and self management), nor that democracy 
is premature due the lack of suffi cient preconditions. Rather, the more 
fundamental dilemma is the depoliticisation of democracy and the fact 
that the paradigms are unable to conceptualise the problems and options 
involved. This inability is because the proponents of both the dominant 
arguments agree on a narrow defi nition of democracy in terms of freedoms 
and fair elections – and then either neglect the basic conditions or say 
they have to be created beforehand by other means. The result is that both 
paradigms exclude by defi nition approaches that focus less on democratic 
rules of the game in themselves and more on how these institutions 
may be used and expanded in favour of improved social, economic and 
other conditions. Given that such social democratic oriented paths have 
been quite important, especially in the transition of the previously poor 
Scandinavian countries into welfare states, and that adapted versions 
are now gaining ground in paradigmatic cases such as Brazil, there is an 
obvious need to widen the perspective. 
The challenge is thus to develop a theoretical framework that allows 
for empirical analysis of the problems and options of democratic politics in 
favour of rights based (social democratic) peace and development, not just 
studies of the market and self management driven liberal (and illiberal) 
mainstream .
Such a more inclusive analytical framework needs to facilitate 
both comprehensive analyses on the level of countries and case studies 
Power, Confl ict and Democracy: The AnalyƟ cal Framework
14
on the level of critical factors and dynamics. On the fi rst level, we shall 
expand on attempts to combine assessments of democratic institutions 
and studies of the political power and capacity of the various actors and 
movements involved. These attempts draw on broad surveys such by the 
Demos team (Priyono et.al. 2007 and Demos 2008) as well as comparative 
case studies (e.g. in Harriss et.al. 2004). In the second case, we focus on 
a number of more specifi c problems that relate to the elitist incorporation 
of people into politics at the expense of popular representation. The 
latter approaches benefi t from a recent effort to conceptualise the core 
dimensions and dynamics of representation (Törnquist et.al. forthcoming). 
This does not only apply to the context of “regular” politics but also to 
efforts at democratic confl ict transformation (Uyangoda 2005, 2007).
Comprehensive analyses
The general problems involved in comprehensive studies of power 
and democracy are particularly serious in the global South. On the one 
hand, the tendency in most assessments is to focus on separate elements 
of democracy. These include basic freedoms, human rights, rule of law, 
elections, governance and civil society. Typically, descriptive, globally 
standardised and often static measurements are generated of each 
dimension. Consequently the studies usually fail to relate the factors to 
each other and to also consider actors in quite diverse, unevenly developed 
and changing contexts.3 Moreover, the models that really do also consider 
actors and conditions tend to be limited to quite general indicators.4 On the 
other hand, the approaches concentrating instead on social movements 
and civic organisations rarely relate to democratic theory and institutional 
frameworks. Hence, there is an urgent need to combine studies of 
movements, actors, and institutions. 
In addition, country level studies are abundant but tend to 
be poorly grounded. There is a lack of local level studies in theoretical 
and comparative perspective. Equally serious, commercially driven and 
politically partisan oriented surveys on opinions and attitudes multiply, 
especially in new or reborn electoral democracies as Indonesia. Tragically, 
this is at the expense of impartial data banks and reviews of existing 
knowledge. Hence, easily accessible formal sources and expert statements 
are the most often consulted data. This is in spite of the fact that the 
powerful groups and institutions are the only ones that keep some (but 
usually unreliable) records, that the oral tradition and informal agreements 
dominate, and that as usual the poor majority do not write their memoirs. 
Most seriously, many of these challenges are not only due to the hegemony 
of poorly contextualised western scholars and their “local” counterparts, 
but also the poor standard of theory, data collection and the fragmentation 
of available knowledge and ongoing research. 
A partial exception from these trends is the democracy assessments 
promoted by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) on the prime basis of the British “democratic audit”, 
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pioneered by David Beetham and others (Beetham et.al. 2002). It is true 
that rather static descriptions of institutional performance and opinions 
among people continue to dominate within this framework at the expense 
of integrated analyses of actors, mechanisms and processes.
But there are also improvements, such as in the recent South Asia 
Survey, (CSDS 2007). Moreover, the weaknesses do not undermine the 
theoretical points of departure in Beetham’s work (1999) on the relations 
between democracy and human rights.
An alternative perspective
 The most powerful of Beetham’s argument is that the ends and 
means of democracy must be held apart. Democracy is a disputed concept, 
but most scholars agree on the aims in terms of popular control of public 
affairs on the basis of political equality. Similarly, there is rather general 
agreement that this aim presupposes equal right to participation, the 
authorisation of representatives and offi cials and their representation of 
the people, which in turn calls for responsiveness and accountability, 
transparency and some basic solidarity among people. Finally, much 
of this requires, overlaps with and contribute to human rights. More 
controversially, Beetham et.al. also argue (and we agree) that the aims are 
not absolute but relative, and that the extent to which they are fulfi lled 
depend on the qualities of a number of means. These means remain to 
be identifi ed and do not themselves constitute democracy but may “only”, 
at best, contribute to the aims of democracy. With this, democracy is no 
longer a black box that is either in place or not. Rather, democracy is a 
more or less successful multi-dimensional process – an interaction between 
large numbers of crucial factors and actors in different contexts aiming at 
politically equal popular control of public affairs. 
Similarly important, these theoretical points of departure enable 
the recognition of two seemingly contradictory but in reality complementary 
and most important characteristics. The fi rst characteristic is that the 
basic dimensions of democracy are universal. This is against cultural 
relativist arguments about qualitative differences in the South. The 
universality is because the aims of democracy are defi ned on the basis of 
political and philosophical theory (and need to be contented at that level), 
and because the general means in turn are identifi ed in terms of what is 
absolutely necessary to reach the aims. The second characteristic is that it 
is equally important to analyse the actors’ will and capacity to promote and 
use locally adapted versions of the universal building stones in different 
contexts of institutions and relations of power. This is against world wide 
measurements of static indicators only.
These two characteristics constitute the crucial link between 
institutions, actors and relations of power. The actors need to both 
navigate the conditions and relate to the institutions - which in turn 
opens up for analysis of processes and dynamics. This does not mean 
that “everything is important” and that theory of institutions, structures, 
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and social movements can be added to each other. Rather, the focus is on 
the intrinsic means to promote the aims of democracy, including people’s 
capacity to use them. These intrinsic means are the crucial dimensions 
and dynamics that we need to employ relevant parts of theories about 
institutions, structures and actors to understand and explain.
So what are the intrinsic means of democracy? And what is the 
best way of studying how they are embedded in contextual institutions 
and relations of power? The defi nition of what means that are absolutely 
necessary to foster democracy is ultimately an empirical question about 
what people deem to be public affairs and what has proved crucial to 
generate equal popular control of them. While there is no doubt that factors 
such as social and economic equality and extensive public resources are 
conducive to democracy, there are three reasons for why one should 
focus on the minimal conditions. First, because otherwise the defi nition 
of democracy would be so demanding that very few democracies would 
exist in the fi rst place. Second, because most of the demanding conditions 
would need to be created undemocratically (ahead of democracy) and 
could not be fostered by the minimum tools of democracy. Third, because 
people with different views and interests about matters such as social and 
economic equality and public resources need to agree on basic standards 
of democracy if these formal and informal constitutions shall serve as a 
means for handling their confl icts. 
The intrinsic institutions
What minimum conditions have proved indispensible, theoretically 
and empirically? Beetham et.al. (2002) suggested some 85 institutions 
within three broad categories. The fi rst category was constitutionalism 
by way of the judiciary (equal citizenship, rule of law, justice, civil and 
political rights and socio-economic rights in terms of basic needs and 
regulations). The second was popular sovereignty by way of legislative and 
executive government (democratic elections, representation and responsive 
and accountable government and public administration). The third was 
civic engagement by way of civil society (free and democratically oriented 
media, art, academia, associational life and other forms of add additional 
popular participation including consultation and various forms of “direct 
democracy”).  
In the framework that Demos used for its recent country wide 
resurvey on democracy in Indonesia, the 85 institutions had been boiled 
down to 32.5 This is in addition to questions about the actually existing 
people, demos, since it is far from clear that there is, for instance, a 
generally accepted “Indonesian people”, given regional and communal 
divisions. (Törnquist 2008 b) 
In this framework there are also more specifi c and comprehensive 
criteria to analyse the extent to which various arrangements have “produced” 
democracy. Instead of asking about the general means of democracy in 
the country at large, the fi rst step is to specify in what geographical and 
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frontlines of democratisation that the assessments are made. Thereafter a 
distinction is made between formal rules and informal rules and regulations, 
and questions are asked about (a) the existence of formal arrangements to 
promote each of the requested means of democracy; (b) the performance of 
the existing formal as well as informal arrangements; (c) their geographical 
scope; and (d) their substantive scope (i.e. to what extent matters which 
are deemed to be of public concern are actually included). Finally an index 
is developed to combine the various measures of the extent to which each 
instrument really contribute to democracy.6
Actors’ will and capacity  
As already pointed out it is insuffi cient to only assess the quality of 
the institutional building blocks. Just like a sailor in rough weather must 
be able to understand and adjust to the ship, wind and sea, one must 
also consider the will and capacity of the actors to use and promote the 
instruments given the institutional and structural conditions. This is to 
enable analysis of the dynamics of democracy and the possibilities to foster 
it in order to alter relations of power to thus promote better conditions. 
A simple and fruitful way (that has been tested out by Demos) is 
to operationalise actors’ will by asking in relation to what institutions that 
the actors are in a strong or weak position and whether the actors promote, 
use, abuse and/or avoid them. It is more complicated to operationalise 
the actors’ political capacity. Previous studies and theories about political 
power, movements and other actors point to fi ve clusters of parameters. 
These have been discussed elsewhere in more detail (Törnquist 2002, 
2008 a, 2008 b, Harriss et.al. 2004, and Stokke 2002). The fi rst variables 
are to indicate if the actors are present rather than marginalised on 
central and local levels and in parts of the political landscape such as the 
business sector, interest- and issue groups, self management (including 
co-operatives), parties, parliaments, and executive public institutions. 
These indices relate to theories about exclusion and inclusion, differences 
between new and old movements, sectoral fragmentation, centre versus 
periphery, and the opportunity structure in terms of the relative openness 
and closeness of politics in general. Alternatively one may analyse similar 
factors by drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s (Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002) 
concept of fi elds of interrelated actors and relations of power. 
A second cluster of variables relate more exclusively to Bourdieu’s 
focus on how the actors within the just mentioned “fi elds” are able to 
transform their different sources of power in terms of economic, social 
and cultural capital7 into legitimacy and authority - to thus gain symbolic 
power and political infl uence (ibid). 
The third type of indicators is to analyse whether and how 
actors are able to politicise those of their concerns and aspirations that 
are not personal, i.e. to put their issues, interests and ideologies on the 
political agenda. This relates to theories inspired by, for instance, Jürgen 
Habermas about the public sphere, Antonio Gramsci about hegemony, 
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Pierre Bourdieu about “habitus” (internalised norms, understandings and 
patterns) and the general importance of culture. But the same indicators 
connect also to analyses of increasingly fragmented priorities and agendas, 
especially among actors in civil society and related diffi culties to generate 
common platforms (e.g. Törnquist 2002 and 2008a). 
The fourth group of parameters is to capture whether and how 
the actors are able to organise and mobilise support. This is directly 
linked to theories of power, politics and movements such as advocated by 
Nicos Mouzelis (1986) and Sydney Tarrow (1994), distinguishing between 
incorporation into politics by way of elitist populism, clientelism and 
alternative patronage – and related political fi nancing - or more integrated 
by way of networks and or comprehensive organisation from below. But 
it relates also to analyses such as by Mahmood Mamdani (1996), Partha 
Chatterjee (2004), Houtzager et.al (2007) and Harriss (2006) of different 
inclusion of citizens,  subjects and denizens without capacity to use most 
other rights than that to rally behind and vote for or against leading 
politicians. 
Fifth the roadmaps to analyse whether and how the actors are 
able to approach various governance institutions. The major source of 
inspiration is the growing consensus of the key problem of elitist dominance 
and the poor state of popular representation in spite of exciting attempts 
to initiate new routes. Hence there is a special need for in depth studies 
within this fi eld, to which we shall return shortly. 
Improvements and applications
The above outline will serve as an initial and tentative framework to 
be improved upon in comprehensive analyses of the general problems and 
options of democratic advances towards rights based (social democratic) 
peace and development in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka and 
Indonesia are crucial contrasting cases of the fi rst and second paths to 
democracy in the global South; contrasting cases which anyway, moreover, 
have many problems in common. The fi rst round of analyses will focus 
separately on Indonesia and Sri Lanka; comparisons come later.
The insuffi cient supply of sources and scattered data provide 
a special challenge. In Indonesia, the point of departure is Demos’ 
surveys (Priyono et.al. 2007, Demos 2008, Törnquist 2008 b). These (and 
forthcoming) surveys generate unique information that is based on the 
assessment of grounded experts on problems of democracy along key 
frontlines in all the provinces of the country. While the Demos collective 
follows up the conclusions that are of immediate political importance 
by developing recommendations and facilitating implementation with 
politically active pro-democrats, the PCD Programme provides a framework 
for more comprehensive analysis and comparisons of the empirical data 
at large. The latter expansion will be done through analysis of the original 
data in view of relevant additional results from other already concluded or 
ongoing Indonesian and international studies.
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In Sri Lanka the point of departure is relevant parts of the report 
on the State of Democracy in South Asia (CSDS 2007). Unless special 
funds are provided, it will not be possible to supplement this study with 
similarly extensive assessments by grounded experts as those provided 
by the Demos surveys in Indonesia. Yet, the PCD researchers will add 
information to the South Asia Survey that relate to our framework by 
drawing as far as possible on supplementary results from concluded and 
ongoing separate projects. 
Finally the two comprehensive studies will provide inputs for 
concluding comparisons. But before that, and most crucially, they 
may also serve as continuously developed empirical frameworks for the 
identifi cation and integration of specifi c thematic studies of particularly 
important problems. 
Special focus on representation
The thematic studies shall focus on key aspects of the factors behind 
the crisis of democratisation in the global South – i.e. the depoliticisation 
of public affairs and the insuffi cient popular representation. The relatively 
autonomous political relations between state and people have deteriorated 
and the new civil society related participation is no alternative on its 
own. The public resources and capacities vested with the state have been 
hollowed out. Economic and political power in countries such as Sri Lanka 
and Indonesia rests primarily with actors related to “informalised” state 
institutions and private business. The relations between state and people 
are increasingly mediated by on the one hand communal, patronage- and 
network based groups and by on the other market institutions, neither 
of which are subject to democratic control. The major challenge is thus 
to analyse the dynamics of the actually existing mediation as well as the 
potentials and efforts at improved popular representation.
Approaches to representation
Such analyses in turn call for fruitful analytical tools. Representation 
is a complex and contented concept. We shall draw on a recent attempt 
to develop an inclusive framework on the basis of theory and empirical 
studies of efforts to counter the demise of popular politics (Törnquist et.al 
forthcoming). As outlined by Pitkin (1967), representation presupposes a 
representative, the represented, something that is being represented and 
a political context. The dynamics is primarily about authorisation and 
accountability, which presuppose transparency and responsiveness. That 
which is represented may be substantive, descriptive and/or symbolic. 
Substantive representation is when the representative “acts for” the 
represented, for instance a leader advancing the interests of workers. 
Descriptive representation is when an actor “stands for” the represented by 
being “objectively” similar. For instance, a woman represents women and a 
resident in a village represents the other villagers. Symbolic representation, 
fi nally, is when an actor is perceived by the represented to once again 
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“stand for” them, but now, for instance, in terms of shared culture and 
identities. However, symbolic representation may also be understood with 
authors like Bourdieu (Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002) and Anderson (1983) 
in the wider sense of constructing the demos, the groups and the interests 
that are being represented and claiming to be a legitimate authority as a 
representative. 
There are two major approaches.8 The fi rst may be called the chain-
of-popular-sovereignty approach. It is typically adhered to by students of 
political institutions, focusing on formally regulated politics, government 
and public administration. The second is what will be labelled the direct-
democracy approach. This is more common among political sociologists, 
anthropologists and students of rights and law. They emphasise the 
importance of informal arrangements and the need for alternative 
participation through popular movements and lobby groups as well as 
civic action in for instance neighbourhood groups and associations for self-
management. 
There are two related tendencies towards deteriorated representation 
within the chain of popular sovereignty. One is that public matters and 
resources have been reduced and fragmented under neo-liberalism and 
globalisation beyond democratic representation. The other tendency is that 
almost all of the links in the chain itself are tarnished. This is especially 
with regard to the intermediary representative institutions from civic 
organisation to political parties. Mass based interest organisations have 
been radically weakened, most severely those based on class. While public 
resources and capacities are shrinking, politicians and political parties lose 
fi rm and independent popular roots. The privatisation, informalisation, 
depoliticisation and weakening of the intermediary political institutions 
generate further distrust in the authorisation of representatives and their 
mandates. Representative politics is often looked upon as a particularly 
dirty business characterised by money and personality oriented politics, 
non-programmatic organisational machines and crooked politicians. This 
in turn has generated alternative routes. But the various supplementary 
forms of democracy - by taking matters to court and to institutions in civil 
society for self-fi nanced self-management and direct participation, pressure 
and informal contacts - are largely detached from the chain of popular 
sovereignty. The civic organisations and activists themselves are rarely 
subject to basic principles of democratic representation, authorisation and 
accountability. Moreover, communal ethnic and religious organisations as 
well as families and clans cater to an increasing number of popular worries 
and needs, typically amongst the weaker sections of the population with 
insuffi cient capacities to make use of civic rights. When not claiming equal 
civic, political and socio-economic rights for all but specifi c communal 
privileges, these organisations and solidarities tend to fragment the demos 
and to undermine democracy. 
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While the advantage of the chains-of-popular-sovereignty 
approach is precision and conceptual consistency in relation to democratic 
theory, one drawback is thus that contextual differences such as between 
the exit from organised politics by strong citizens in the North and the 
marginalisation from organised politics of vulnerable majorities in the 
South are often neglected. Another weakness is that practices outside 
the formally recognised chain tend to be set aside such as attempts at 
participatory governance and struggles over public affairs that have been 
privatised or informalised.
Unfortunately, however, the direct-democracy approach does not 
provide a good alternative but rather focus on the other or neglected side 
of the coin. Interestingly, this is done from two directions, one which is 
more market oriented, supported by e.g. the World Bank (1997) and in 
favour of user- and consumer participation (rather than citizenship and 
popular sovereignty); another advocated by critics of globalisation like 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) who argue that state and power 
has been so dispersed and localised that there is no decisive unit left to 
fi ght and that increasingly many producers are regulating social relations 
themselves, so that strong parties and representative democracy are 
unnecessary and even irrelevant. Both positions support thus the position 
of Robert Putnam (1993) and others that the “real” demos develops 
organically from below among self managing and co-operating citizens 
(thus developing “social capital”), not in relation to ideologies, institutions 
and political engagement. Hence, representation becomes redundant since 
the people act directly through the same contacts and associations that 
have constituted the people in the fi rst place. Further, almost whatever 
“civic” organisation becomes “parts of the people itself”. Hence there is 
no need to analyse, for instance, differences between organisations that 
relate to “rights-bearing citizens” and people who lack suffi cient capacity 
to promote their own rights. Further, one does not need to discuss the 
importance of intermediary variables such as politics and ideology. The fact 
that Scandinavian democracy and welfare states as well as contemporary 
participatory budgeting, for instance, have all been politically facilitated 
and then sustained is conveniently forgotten. 
However, many civil society activists are now more anxious than 
before to legitimate their work in terms of whom they try to represent 
(Houtzager 2007). Moreover, the new institutions for direct participation 
such as participatory planning are (just like previous Scandinavian 
experiences of combining liberal political democracy and interest based 
representation and cooperation between government and associations) 
attempts to initiate anew layer of representation between electoral chains of 
popular sovereignty and associational life and populism on the other. (C.f. 
Avritzer 2002, Baiocchi 2005, Esping-Andersen 1985, Berman 2006) Yet, 
a number of questions remain to be answered such as how to guarantee 
authorisation and accountability, and even more diffi cult, how to identify 
and agree on what parts of the demos should control what sections of 
public affairs on the basis of political equality.
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An integrated framework
Given that the primacy of popular sovereignty must thus be 
combined with collective efforts to widen democracy beyond the formal 
public institutions, the focal point may be democratic representation. The 
Programme will draw on the inclusive defi nition of democracy that has 
already been outlined as a guide for the comprehensive analyses of power 
and democracy. Hence, there are three basic pillars of a framework for 
the study of representation: (1) the people (demos), (2) the public matters, 
and (3) the different intermediary ways of exercising popular control of 
the input as well as output sides of democracy; i.e. policymaking and 
implementation.  Democratic policy making (input) and implementation 
(output) need to be representative by, fi rst, being based on the principles 
of political equality and impartiality and, second, subject to authorisation 
with mandate and to accountability with transparency and responsiveness. 
The actual content of what is thus being decided and implemented is due to 
the will of the demos but must be supportive of the principles of democracy 
and the absolutely necessary means to develop and apply them. Figure 1 
presents a preliminary integrated framework for the study of democratic 
representation.
Figure 1. An inclusive model for the study of 
democracy oriented representation
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First, the people. As any student of communal politics in general 
or the Sri Lankan Tamil- and Indonesian Aceh confl icts in particular is 
well aware of, the defi nition of the demos can not be taken for granted. 
Globalisation and the hollowing out of the state (on central but also local 
level) tend to disintegrate and produce overlapping demos in relation 
to various issues, spheres and territories. Higher mobility, migration, 
continued subordination of women, less unifi ed workplaces and increasing 
separation of workplaces and residence add to the picture as do identity 
politics. Who are citizens with actual rights and who are instead next to 
subjects? Who have the right to vote and a say in other ways, and who has 
not? Who have the right to control certain aspects of the public matters 
but not other? What is the capacity of various sections of people to voice 
their views and interests and act accordingly, individually or collectively? 
Second, the public affairs that people are supposed to control are 
also not pre-given. As we know from the defi nition of democracy, the issue 
boils down to a dispute about what factors that are intrinsic to develop and 
sustain democracy. During the third wave, limited democracy has proved 
possible even under harsh conditions. However, the limitations are severe 
and it has become equally clear that increased public and popular capacity 
to promote and use the conventional instruments is necessary; necessary 
to make political democracy substantial enough to serve as a framework 
for additional aspirations such as rights based peace and sustainable 
development. Hence, while it may be obvious that the core institutions for 
public government include the legislative and its executive, the civil and 
military administration, the judiciary and the police, it remains a matter of 
dispute as to whether for instance domestic violence or work environment 
are part of public government. Similarly it is vital to consider institutions 
for self-governance such as co-operatives as well as different combinations 
of private, civic- and public governance and government in the form of joint 
ventures, auxiliary bodies and sub-contracting. Finally it is particularly 
important in analysis of countries like Sri Lanka and Indonesia to include 
both formal and informal institutions and to ask about their capacities in 
terms of performance as well as their geographical and substantive scope.
Given the general tendencies of less public and more polycentric 
governance, a particularly crucial issue are the prospects for democratic 
regulation of more or less privatised institutions of governance rather than 
reclaiming these institutions, which may not be feasible. Along the top row 
in Figure 1, privatised collective transportation, schools, or health services, 
for instance, would thus be subject to democratically decided rules and 
regulations.9 Another basic question is whether or not democratic governance 
would be conducive to fi ght corruption and promote environmentally and 
socially responsible economic growth. There is an urgent need to analyse 
democratic alternatives to the resurgence of the thesis about the need to 
promote fi rm institutions, rule of law and economic development ahead 
of popular sovereignty by supposedly enlightened authoritarian rule. The 
same holds true for democratic alternatives to accommodate rebels like 
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those in Aceh, rather than by divisive clientelism and “special favours”. In 
the fi gure on representation, attempts to apply participatory governance 
to improve responsiveness and accountability (such as attempted at for 
instance in Brazil; e.g. Baiocchi 2005) would be by more substantial 
arrangements for participation and representation that are attached to 
the various institutions for governance (especially the executive ones) and 
sections of the demos. Further, the renewed interest in learning from old 
Scandinavian social pacts (c.f. Beckman et.al. 2000, Beckman 2004) may 
be indicated in terms of triangular relations and agreements (about the 
exchange between state guaranteed economic growth and collective wage 
agreements, and universal unemployment- and social welfare schemes) 
between productive sections of capital within the context of private 
governance, relevant sections of the institutions for public government, 
and well organised trade unions and related movements.
Third, the various forms of mediation in-between the demos and the 
public affairs. The mediation relates both to the input and output side of 
democracy; to the politically equal generation of policies and to the impartial 
implementation (the latter of which seems to be positively related to the 
more universal as opposed to means-tested measures that are applied; 
c.f. Rothstein and Torell (2005). Arrangements for participation and 
representation that are related to the different institutions for governance 
of public matters are in the upper part of the model. This includes not only 
the elected legislative assemblies and their executives on the central and 
local levels. There are also, for instance, various possible institutions for 
consultation and participation in relation to a number of administrative 
boards and commissions, workers’ participation in company management, 
the meetings of a neighbourhood organisation, or academic self-rule. Most 
of the introduction of these institutionalised forms of representation may 
well have been enforced from below through pilot cases and demands 
on politicians. However, the very implementation tend to be a product 
of top-down measures and decentralisation, in Scandinavia and Kerala, 
for instance, on the basis of strong state apparatuses or state-building 
projects and the legacies of free farmer communities and land reforms 
respectively. For good and for bad, moreover, these roots and measures 
in turn have then formed much of the system of representation, including 
parties, movements and even the constitution of the demos. 
Far down in the model, representation is also framed by the different 
formations and expressions of the demos and the means of representation. 
The means include the actors and their authorization, responsiveness 
and accountability - as well as their capacity to voice interests and ideas 
and act accordingly, ideally on the basis of political equality. On the left 
side of the model are the forms of self-representation and participation. 
Strictly speaking, this is the only form of direct democracy, i.e. where 
no representative is involved. On the right side is the representation via 
mediators. A basic distinction may be made between mediation via (a) civil 
society defi ned as associational life among rights bearing citizens, primarily 
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within civic oriented NGOs, local communities, popular organisations, 
media, academia, and cultural life; (b) informal leaders and non-civic-
associations such as patrons, fi xers, communal associations, clan leaders 
and “popular fi gures”; and (c) political society including political parties, 
politically related interest organisations and pressure and lobby groups. 
One related question is the fate of democracies dominated by 
clientelism through informal leaders and privileged political fi nancing. 
Another dilemma (that have been addressed at in thematic studies related 
to Demos’ research; Priyono et. al. forthcoming and Törnquist 2007c and 
forthcoming) is the weak and generally problematic linkages between on 
the one hand civic associations (that are often rather small and confi ned 
to middle class residents or activists), and more mass based and popular 
oriented movements. The same applies for the crucial problems of scaling 
up such linkages and co-operations on various levels and to make an 
impact within the organised politics tend to be dominated by powerful 
elites.
Conclusion
In short, the initial analytical challenge of the PCD programme is to 
develop a framework that allows for empirical analysis of the problems and 
options of democratic politics in favour of rights based (social democratic) 
peace and development in theoretical and comparative perspective. 
Analytically, the Programme works in three phases that overlap 
partially. The fi rst and phase is comprehensive analysis in each of the 
major contexts (Sri Lanka and Indonesia) of power, confl ict and democracy. 
This phase is brief, as much knowledge is already available, in Indonesia 
from Demos’ survey and in Sri Lanka from the South Asia survey. The 
initial point of departure for the joint framework for this purpose is that 
which has been tested out in Demos’ studies of the problems and options 
of Indonesian democracy. This frame in turn combines and expands on, 
on the one hand, generally accepted theoretical points of departure for 
assessing democratic institutions, and on the other hand widely acclaimed 
theories of power and social and political movements to explain the 
actors’ will and capacity to promote and use the institutions. Empirically, 
moreover, the original framework (which may only partially be possible to 
apply in Sri Lanka) is based in interviews to gain systematic assessments 
by grounded and experienced experts in different contexts and sectors 
around the countries. In the PCD Programme, this will be combined with 
more conventional data banks, surveys and thematic- and case oriented 
studies.  
The second and major phase includes two steps. One is to identify 
within the general framework the most essential problems that relate to the 
dilemmas of depoliticisation, the defi cit of democratic representation and 
the prospects for popular representation and democratic transformation 
of confl icts – all of which is deemed to be the major causes for the current 
crisis of democratisation in the global South. The other step is to carry out a 
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number of reviews of existing knowledge as well as supplementary specifi c 
studies. The more precise analytical framework for the second phase of 
the programme focuses on democratic representation. The insights from 
previous collective writings on Politicising Democracy (2004) and Rethinking 
Popular Representation (forthcoming) are taken as points of departure, in 
addition to frameworks for studies of transformation of confl icts. The major 
thrust is to integrate the two separately dominant perspectives – the chain 
of popular sovereignty approach and the direct democracy approach. This 
is done by focussing on the construction of the demos, on what parts of the 
demos that control what parts of the public affairs, and on the problems 
and options of developing and combining participation and mediation in 
ways that do not compromise the principles of democratic representation. 
The third phase is to continuously update and expand on the 
initial comprehensive analyses of power, confl ict and democracy in each 
contexts by drawing on the results from the specifi c studies (during the 
second step) - and to fi nally compare the two thus more complete analysis 
in wider theoretical and international comparative perspective.
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Endnotes
1 This article grows out of the collective work behind my introductory chapter to 
the forthcoming anthology (Palgrave) Rethinking Popular Representation, edited 
by Kristian Stokke, Neil Webster and myself. I am most thankful for valuable 
comments from Kristian Stokke and the colleagues behind that volume, several 
of whom are also associated with the PCD programme as well as many of the new 
PCD group. All the remaining mistakes are my own.
2 For the details, see the Introduction to this issue of the PCD journal, Törnquist 
et.al. 2008.
3 The most well know example is probably that of the Freedom House ratings.
4 The reports by the World Bank (1997) and UNDP (2002) are good examples, but c.f. 
also scholarly works such as Hadenius (1992).
5 Evaluations of the survey point to the need to add specifi c questions on interest 
based representation and institutions for “direct” participation in policymaking as 
well as the executive. The 32 means of democracy are described in Samadhi and 
Warouw’s article in this edition.
6 Within the index (0-100), the relative importance of performance and geographical 
and substantive scope was deemed to be 50%, 25% and 25% respectively. Further, 
the relative importance of formal and informal institutions was deemed to be 70% 
and 30% respectively. Finally the value of the formal institutions was reduced 
with the proportion of informants stating that no formal institutions existed in 
the fi rms place.
7 While the meaning of economic capital may be self evident (and may well be 
expended by more qualifi ed analysis of the political economy between neo-
liberalism and state sponsored business under globalisation; see e.g. Harriss-
White 2003, Kohli 2004 and Khan 2005), social capital in mainly about “good 
contacts”, and cultural capital involves information and knowledge. In Demos’ 
survey yet another category has been added to cover the power by way of coercion, 
including by military force but also mass demonstrations such as the “people 
power” phenomenon in the Philippines.
8 The following sections draw particularly closely on Törnquist et.al. (forthcoming), 
which in turn is incepted to the collective work for Harriss et.al (2004) and 
inspiration from the public discourse on the Norwegian research programme 
on power and democracy (c.f. Østerud 2003 and 2007) and the working papers 
by Stokke (2002), Houtzager et.al (2005) and Castiglione and Warren (2005) in 
addition to the fi nding out with Demos if and how the framework and concepts 
would make sense in reality.
9 This is a long established practice of social democratic governance but it has 
also been tried in scattered local settings in, for instance, the Philippines (e.g. 
Rocamora 2004 and Quimpo 2004) and in cases such as Brazil, South Africa 
and the Indian state of Kerala and West Bengal (see e.g. Avritzer 2002, Baiocchi 
2003 and 2005, Fung and Wright 2003, Heller 2001, Isaac and Franke (2000), 
Tharakan 2004, Jones and Stokke 2005, Buhlungu (2006), Ballard, Habib and 
Valodia (2006), Webster (1992), Rogaly and Harriss White (1999).
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